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Abstract	  Access	  to	  visual	  awareness	  for	  human	  faces	  is	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  their	  spatial	  orientation:	  Under	  continuous	  flash	  suppression	  (CFS),	  upright	  faces	  break	  into	  awareness	  more	  quickly	  than	  inverted	  faces,	  and	  this	  effect	  of	  inversion	  is	  larger	  than	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  animate	  and	  inanimate	  objects.	  Here	  we	  asked	  whether	  this	  apparently	  specific	  sensitivity	  to	  upright	  faces	  reflects	  face-­‐specific	  detection	  mechanisms	  or	  whether	  it	  reflects	  perceptual	  expertise	  more	  generally.	  We	  tested	  car	  experts	  who	  varied	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  car	  and	  face	  expertise	  and	  measured	  the	  time	  upright	  and	  inverted	  faces,	  cars,	  and	  chairs	  needed	  to	  overcome	  CFS	  and	  break	  into	  awareness.	  Results	  showed	  that	  greater	  car	  expertise	  was	  correlated	  with	  larger	  car	  inversion	  effects	  under	  CFS.	  Interestingly,	  a	  similar	  relation	  between	  better	  discrimination	  performance	  and	  larger	  CFS	  inversion	  effects	  was	  found	  for	  faces.	  CFS	  inversion	  effects	  are	  thus	  modulated	  by	  perceptual	  expertise	  for	  both	  faces	  and	  cars.	  These	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  inversion	  effects	  in	  conscious	  access	  are	  not	  unique	  to	  faces	  but	  similarly	  exist	  for	  other	  objects	  of	  expertise.	  More	  generally,	  we	  interpret	  these	  findings	  as	  suggesting	  that	  access	  to	  awareness	  and	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination	  rely	  on	  partially	  shared	  perceptual	  mechanisms.	  	   Keywords:	  Visual	  awareness,	  Perceptual	  expertise,	  Face	  perception,	  Interocular	  suppression,	  Continuous	  flash	  suppression.	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Privileged	  access	  to	  awareness	  for	  faces	  and	  objects	  of	  expertise	  At	  any	  given	  moment,	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  the	  sensory	  information	  from	  the	  environment	  is	  consciously	  experienced	  (Baars,	  1997;	  Dennett,	  2001).	  Due	  to	  capacity	  limitations,	  non-­‐conscious	  representations	  of	  various	  aspects	  of	  sensory	  information	  are	  thought	  to	  compete	  for	  access	  to	  awareness	  (Koch,	  2004).	  While	  it	  is	  well	  established	  that	  even	  such	  non-­‐conscious	  stimulus	  representations	  can	  influence	  behavior	  (Kouider	  &	  Dehaene,	  2007),	  representations	  that	  eventually	  gain	  access	  to	  awareness	  have	  a	  special	  status:	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  the	  global	  workspace	  model,	  only	  conscious	  content	  is	  globally	  distributed	  to	  functionally	  specialized	  subsystems	  that	  engage	  in	  long-­‐range	  interactions	  to	  optimally	  guide	  goal-­‐directed	  behavior	  in	  non-­‐automatic,	  flexible	  and	  adaptive	  ways	  (Baars,	  1988,	  1997).	  	  
Breaking	  Continuous	  Flash	  Suppression	  (b-­‐CFS)	  Which	  factors	  in	  the	  sensory	  input	  determine	  which	  stimulus	  representations	  are	  more	  potent	  competitors	  for	  access	  to	  this	  capacity-­‐limited	  stage	  of	  conscious	  perception?	  For	  the	  visual	  modality,	  several	  recent	  studies	  have	  used	  a	  novel	  experimental	  paradigm	  called	  breaking	  continuous	  flash	  suppression	  (b-­‐CFS;	  Jiang,	  Costello,	  &	  He,	  2007;	  Stein,	  Hebart,	  &	  Sterzer,	  2011a;	  see	  Figure	  1a)	  to	  quantify	  potency	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  awareness.	  In	  this	  paradigm	  continuous	  flash	  suppression	  (CFS;	  Tsuchiya	  &	  Koch,	  2005)	  is	  used	  to	  render	  a	  visual	  stimulus	  shown	  to	  one	  eye	  invisible	  for	  up	  to	  several	  seconds	  by	  flashing	  high-­‐contrast,	  contour-­‐rich	  CFS	  masks	  at	  about	  10	  Hz	  into	  the	  other	  eye.	  CFS	  represents	  a	  particularly	  strong	  variant	  of	  binocular	  rivalry,	  which	  is	  thought	  to	  result	  from	  reciprocal	  interactions	  between	  representations	  of	  the	  two	  stimuli	  shown	  to	  the	  two	  eyes	  at	  multiple	  sites	  of	  the	  visual	  system	  (Sterzer,	  Stein,	  Ludwig,	  Rothkirch,	  &	  Hesselmann,	  2014;	  Tong,	  Meng,	  &	  Blake,	  2006),	  thereby	  opening	  a	  window	  into	  the	  competitive	  dynamics	  underlying	  conscious	  perception.	  The	  CFS	  masks	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initially	  dominate	  perception	  until	  the	  stimulus	  shown	  to	  the	  other	  eye	  eventually	  overcomes	  suppression	  and	  breaks	  into	  awareness.	  In	  b-­‐CFS,	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  observers	  to	  detect	  or	  localize	  the	  suppressed	  stimulus	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  measure	  of	  access	  to	  awareness.	  While	  it	  is	  well	  established	  that	  physical	  stimulus	  “strength”,	  reflecting	  low-­‐level	  stimulus	  characteristics	  such	  as	  luminance	  contrast,	  is	  the	  main	  determinant	  of	  potency	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  awareness	  in	  b-­‐CFS,	  more	  recent	  evidence	  demonstrates	  that	  also	  higher-­‐level	  properties	  of	  visual	  stimuli,	  such	  as	  their	  structure,	  familiarity,	  or	  ecological	  relevance,	  can	  influence	  competition	  for	  visual	  awareness.	  When	  differences	  in	  lower	  level	  physical	  stimulus	  properties	  are	  equated,	  stimuli	  with	  greater	  familiarity,	  meaningfulness,	  or	  relevance	  break	  into	  awareness	  more	  quickly	  (reviewed	  by	  Gayet,	  Van	  der	  Stigchel,	  &	  Paffen,	  2014).	  These	  b-­‐CFS	  studies	  demonstrate	  that	  higher-­‐level	  stimulus	  properties	  are	  being	  registered	  prior	  to	  suppression	  release,	  equipping	  more	  familiar,	  meaningful,	  or	  relevant	  stimuli	  with	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  limited	  processing	  stage	  of	  conscious	  awareness.	  	  
Face-­‐specific	  Inversion	  Effects	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  A	  particularly	  robust	  and	  well-­‐replicated	  finding	  is	  that	  suppression	  times	  for	  pictures	  of	  human	  faces	  are	  strongly	  modulated	  by	  the	  orientation	  in	  which	  they	  are	  displayed:	  Upright	  faces	  break	  into	  awareness	  more	  quickly	  than	  the	  same	  faces	  shown	  in	  inverted	  orientation,	  i.e.,	  rotated	  by	  180	  degrees	  (e.g.,	  Jiang	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Stein	  et	  al.,	  2011a;	  Yang,	  Zald,	  &	  Blake,	  2007).	  Because	  upright	  and	  inverted	  faces	  are	  physically	  identical	  (i.e.	  they	  consist	  of	  the	  same	  pixels),	  this	  face	  inversion	  effect	  must	  be	  due	  to	  higher-­‐level	  differences,	  most	  likely	  reflecting	  the	  visual	  system’s	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  prototypical	  spatial	  configuration	  of	  facial	  parts	  (i.e.,	  two	  eyes	  above	  nose	  above	  mouth;	  McKone,	  Kanwisher,	  &	  Duchaine,	  2007),	  which	  is	  distorted	  in	  inverted	  faces.	  A	  similarly	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strong	  impact	  of	  stimulus	  inversion	  on	  access	  to	  awareness	  has	  been	  found	  for	  human	  bodies,	  while	  no	  comparable	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  exist	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  familiar	  object	  categories,	  including	  monkey	  faces,	  animal	  bodies,	  and	  inanimate	  objects	  (Stein,	  Sterzer,	  &	  Peelen,	  2012),	  or	  houses	  (Zhou,	  Zhang,	  Liu,	  Yang,	  &	  Qu,	  2010).	  Thus,	  only	  human	  faces	  and	  bodies	  in	  their	  common	  upright	  configuration	  of	  parts	  are	  prioritized	  for	  access	  to	  conscious	  awareness.	  While	  these	  previous	  b-­‐CFS	  studies	  demonstrated	  that	  upright	  human	  faces	  and	  bodies	  are	  “special”	  in	  their	  potency	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  awareness,	  they	  did	  not	  address	  the	  underlying	  mechanism	  for	  this	  face-­‐	  and	  body-­‐specificity.	  	  
Putative	  Face-­‐specific	  Mechanisms	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  disproportionately	  large	  inversion	  effects	  for	  faces	  and	  bodies	  reflect	  domain-­‐specific	  perceptual	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  innate	  or	  develop	  early	  in	  life	  (Johnson,	  2005;	  McKone	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  In	  newborns,	  a	  fast	  subcortical	  pathway	  involving	  the	  superior	  colliculus,	  the	  pulvinar,	  and	  the	  amygdala	  nuclei	  is	  thought	  to	  mediate	  orienting	  to	  face-­‐like	  stimuli.	  While	  it	  had	  long	  been	  assumed	  that	  this	  pathway	  would	  serve	  no	  functional	  role	  in	  adult	  face	  perception,	  more	  recent	  findings	  indicate	  that	  the	  subcortical	  route	  supports	  the	  initial	  face	  detection	  over	  the	  course	  of	  one’s	  life	  (reviewed	  by	  Johnson,	  Senju,	  &	  Tomalski,	  2015).	  Evidence	  for	  a	  role	  of	  the	  subcortical	  face	  detection	  pathway	  in	  adults	  comes	  primarily	  from	  studies	  tapping	  early,	  rapid	  visual	  processing	  by	  measuring	  fast	  saccadic	  responses	  (Nakano,	  Higashida,	  &	  Kitazawa,	  2013;	  Tomalski,	  Csibra,	  &	  Johnson,	  2009)	  or	  by	  recording	  subcortical	  neural	  activity	  to	  faces	  rendered	  invisible	  through	  interocular	  suppression	  (reviewed	  by	  Sterzer	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  It	  thus	  seems	  possible	  that	  the	  visual	  processes	  preceding	  and	  leading	  to	  suppression	  release	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  involve	  subcortical	  pathway	  activity.	  Indeed,	  specific	  stimulus	  properties	  that	  modulate	  looking	  preferences	  in	  newborns	  (Farroni	  et	  al.,	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2005)	  have	  been	  found	  to	  have	  a	  similar	  influence	  on	  adults’	  awareness	  of	  upright	  relative	  to	  inverted	  faces	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  (Stein,	  Peelen,	  &	  Sterzer,	  2011b).	  	  However,	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  awareness	  of	  faces	  is	  modulated	  by	  visual	  experience:	  Upright	  faces	  of	  friends	  are	  associated	  with	  shorter	  suppression	  times	  than	  upright	  faces	  of	  strangers	  (Gobbini	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  and	  the	  inversion	  effect	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  is	  larger	  for	  faces	  matching	  observers’	  own	  race	  and	  age	  group	  (Stein,	  End,	  &	  Sterzer,	  2014).	  While	  these	  findings	  show	  that	  access	  to	  awareness	  is	  influenced	  by	  experience,	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  compatible	  with	  experience-­‐based	  tuning	  of	  perceptual	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  faces.	  
Putative	  Expertise-­‐related	  Mechanisms	  Alternatively,	  these	  face-­‐	  and	  body-­‐specific	  effects	  may	  at	  least	  partly	  be	  the	  result	  of	  our	  extensive	  experience	  in	  discriminating	  individual	  faces	  and	  bodies	  	  (Diamond	  &	  Carey,	  1986;	  Gauthier	  &	  Tarr,	  1997,	  2002).	  A	  key	  prediction	  of	  the	  expertise	  account	  is	  that	  extensive	  experience	  in	  discriminating	  exemplars	  from	  object	  categories	  other	  than	  faces	  would	  result	  in	  “face-­‐like”	  processing	  of	  objects	  from	  these	  categories.	  (Gauthier	  &	  Logothetis,	  2000).	  The	  disproportionally	  strong	  effect	  of	  inversion	  on	  recognition	  memory	  for	  faces	  relative	  to	  other	  object	  categories	  (e.g.,	  Yin,	  1969)	  is	  often	  regarded	  as	  evidence	  for	  face-­‐specific	  configural	  processing,	  i.e.	  strong	  spatial-­‐relational	  integration	  of	  facial	  parts.	  Previous	  studies	  have	  confirmed	  the	  prediction	  of	  the	  expertise	  account	  using	  discrimination	  tasks,	  showing	  that	  expert-­‐level	  discrimination	  of	  objects	  within	  a	  specific	  category	  such	  as	  cars	  is	  associated	  with	  larger	  inversion	  effects	  (Bruyer	  &	  Crispeels,	  1992;	  Curby,	  Glazek,	  &	  Gauthier,	  2009;	  Diamond	  &	  Carey,	  1986;	  Gauthier,	  Skudlarski,	  Gore,	  &	  Anderson,	  2000;	  Gauthier,	  Williams,	  Tarr,	  &	  Tanaka,	  1998;	  Rossion,	  Gauthier,	  Goffaux,	  Tarr,	  &	  Crommelinck,	  2002;	  Xu,	  Liu,	  &	  Kanwisher,	  2005;	  but	  see	  Robbins	  &	  McKone,	  2007).	  These	  findings	  show	  that	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extensive	  training	  in	  individual-­‐level	  discrimination	  can	  result	  in	  enhanced	  configural	  processing	  of	  non-­‐face	  objects	  in	  tasks	  in	  which	  observers	  have	  to	  identify	  individual	  exemplars,	  that	  is,	  when	  stimuli	  are	  consciously	  perceived	  and	  both	  training	  and	  test	  demand	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination.	  Interestingly,	  recent	  evidence	  shows	  that	  perceptual	  expertise	  can	  influence	  performance	  even	  in	  tasks	  that	  do	  not	  require	  identification	  of	  exemplars.	  Experts	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  better	  at	  searching	  for	  targets	  from	  their	  category	  of	  expertise	  among	  distractor	  objects	  from	  other	  categories,	  both	  in	  difficult	  visual	  search	  in	  multi-­‐element	  displays	  (Hershler	  &	  Hochstein,	  2009)	  and	  in	  photographs	  of	  cluttered	  real-­‐world	  scenes	  (Reeder,	  Stein,	  &	  Peelen,	  2015).	  While	  these	  studies	  demonstrate	  that	  objects	  of	  expertise	  are	  more	  efficiently	  discriminated	  from	  other	  objects,	  they	  do	  not	  address	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  objects	  of	  expertise	  are	  prioritized	  for	  access	  to	  awareness	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  selection	  and	  categorization	  demands,	  as	  found	  for	  faces	  and	  bodies.	  	  Evidence	  that	  some	  forms	  of	  real-­‐world	  expertise	  –	  broadly	  construed	  as	  being	  exceptionally	  skilled	  in	  a	  certain	  domain	  (e.g.	  chess	  playing,	  high	  jumping,	  typewriting)	  –	  can	  indeed	  influence	  the	  extent	  of	  unconscious	  processing	  comes	  from	  several	  recent	  masked	  priming	  studies.	  Expertise-­‐related	  stimuli	  have	  been	  found	  to	  exert	  stronger	  priming	  effects	  in	  experts	  than	  in	  novices	  (Güldenpenning,	  Koester,	  Kunde,	  Weigelt,	  &	  Schack,	  2011;	  Heinemann,	  Kiesel,	  Pohl,	  &	  Kunde,	  2010;	  Kiesel,	  Kunde,	  Pohl,	  Berner,	  &	  Hoffmann,	  2009).	  These	  studies	  convincingly	  demonstrate	  that	  some	  forms	  of	  real-­‐world	  expertise	  can	  modulate	  initial,	  non-­‐conscious	  visual	  processing.	  They	  did	  not,	  however,	  address	  whether	  expertise	  in	  exemplar-­‐level	  object	  discrimination	  (of	  which	  face	  recognition	  is	  the	  prototypical	  example)	  can	  influence	  the	  visual	  processes	  that	  lead	  to	  conscious	  awareness.	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The	  Present	  Study	  	   To	  address	  this	  question,	  in	  the	  current	  study	  we	  measured	  the	  relationship	  between	  perceptual	  expertise	  with	  a	  non-­‐face	  category	  (cars)	  and	  inversion	  effects	  for	  this	  category	  in	  b-­‐CFS.	  To	  rule	  out	  potential	  confounds	  that	  can	  arise	  from	  comparing	  expert	  vs.	  novices	  (e.g.	  differences	  in	  overall	  motivation	  or	  vigilance)	  we	  recruited	  only	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts	  who	  varied	  in	  their	  perceptual	  performance	  on	  a	  sequential	  car	  matching	  task.	  Performance	  in	  this	  discrimination	  task	  provided	  an	  objective	  assessment	  of	  car	  expertise	  (e.g.,	  Gauthier	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  McGugin,	  Gatenby,	  Gore,	  &	  Gauthier,	  2012).	  If	  perceptual	  expertise	  were	  related	  to	  face-­‐like	  configural	  processing	  in	  access	  to	  awareness,	  we	  expected	  car	  discrimination	  performance	  to	  be	  positively	  correlated	  with	  car	  inversion	  effects	  in	  b-­‐CFS.	  If,	  however,	  prioritized	  awareness	  of	  faces	  and	  bodies	  were	  mediated	  by	  perceptual	  mechanisms	  specifically	  tuned	  to	  detect	  conspecifics	  (Stein	  et	  al.,	  2011b,	  2012),	  no	  such	  positive	  correlation	  would	  be	  expected	  for	  cars.	  Furthermore,	  if	  prioritized	  conscious	  access	  were	  mediated	  by	  perceptual	  expertise,	  one	  may	  also	  expect	  the	  advantage	  of	  upright	  over	  inverted	  faces	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  to	  be	  positively	  correlated	  with	  individual	  face	  recognition	  abilities,	  which	  are	  highly	  variable	  (Bowles	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Alternatively,	  if	  awareness	  of	  faces	  were	  governed	  by	  a	  distinct	  detection	  mechanism	  (Johnson,	  2005;	  Stein	  et	  al.,	  2011b),	  no	  such	  positive	  correlation	  would	  be	  expected.	  In	  addition,	  we	  investigated	  whether	  configural	  processing	  in	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination	  is	  related	  to	  configural	  processing	  at	  the	  transition	  to	  visual	  awareness.	  To	  test	  this,	  we	  correlated	  inversion	  effects	  from	  car	  and	  face	  discrimination	  tasks	  with	  car	  and	  face	  inversion	  effects	  in	  b-­‐CFS.	  A	  positive	  correlation	  between	  inversion	  effects	  for	  the	  different	  categories	  would	  suggest	  that	  these	  tasks	  rely	  on	  partially	  shared	  perceptual	  mechanisms,	  with	  perceptual	  expertise	  enhancing	  configural	  processing	  at	  multiple	  levels	  of	  the	  processing	  hierarchy.	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Method	  
Participants	  All	  participants	  in	  the	  study	  were	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts,	  recruited	  through	  postings	  to	  the	  University	  of	  Trento	  online	  subject	  pool	  and	  through	  flyers	  (distributed	  in	  libraries,	  university	  buildings,	  and	  car-­‐related	  shops),	  stating	  that	  we	  were	  looking	  for	  car	  enthusiasts	  to	  take	  part	  in	  an	  experiment	  on	  visual	  perception	  of	  cars.	  Interested	  participants	  were	  tested	  if	  they	  labeled	  themselves	  as	  car	  experts,	  if	  they	  regarded	  themselves	  as	  better	  than	  most	  other	  people	  in	  discriminating	  between	  different	  cars,	  and	  if	  they	  said	  that	  they	  would	  regularly	  spend	  time	  on	  cars	  (e.g.,	  auto	  shows)	  or	  read	  about	  cars	  or	  gather	  information	  on	  cars	  in	  some	  other	  way	  (e.g.,	  through	  car	  magazines,	  the	  Internet,	  blogs,	  TV,	  discussions	  with	  friends).	  That	  way	  all	  participants	  were	  recruited	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  avoiding	  selection	  biases	  (Reeder	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  Importantly,	  objectively	  assessed	  car	  expertise	  varied	  substantially	  across	  individuals	  in	  this	  group	  (see	  Results	  below).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  limited	  availability	  of	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts,	  we	  did	  not	  determine	  a	  fixed	  sample	  size	  but	  instead	  tried	  to	  test	  as	  many	  participants	  as	  possible	  over	  a	  period	  of	  approximately	  one	  year.	  	  A	  total	  of	  32	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts	  took	  part	  in	  the	  study.	  After	  excluding	  two	  participants	  with	  extremely	  short	  overall	  suppression	  times	  (means	  of	  0.88	  and	  1.04	  seconds,	  respectively,	  both	  being	  below	  the	  cutoff	  according	  to	  the	  outlier	  labeling	  method	  by	  Hoaglin	  and	  Iglewicz	  (1987)),	  indicating	  that	  CFS	  was	  not	  working	  properly,	  the	  final	  sample	  consisted	  of	  30	  volunteers	  (three	  females,	  27	  males,	  mean	  age	  24.7	  years,	  SD	  =	  8.1	  years).	  All	  participants	  reported	  normal	  or	  corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	  vision,	  were	  naïve	  as	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  experiment,	  and	  received	  a	  monetary	  compensation	  for	  their	  participation.	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Apparatus	  and	  Stimuli	  	   Discrimination	  experiment.	  During	  the	  discrimination	  experiment,	  observers	  viewed	  a	  19-­‐inch	  TFT	  monitor	  (1280	  ×	  1024	  pixels	  resolution,	  60	  Hz	  refresh	  rate)	  from	  a	  free	  viewing	  distance	  of	  approximately	  57	  cm.	  Stimulus	  presentation	  and	  response	  collection	  was	  controlled	  using	  “A	  Simple	  Framework”	  (Schwarzbach,	  2011),	  a	  toolbox	  based	  on	  the	  Psychophysics	  Toolbox	  for	  Matlab	  (The	  MathWorks,	  Natick,	  MA).	  Stimuli	  were	  presented	  centrally	  on	  a	  white	  background.	  A	  central	  black	  fixation	  cross	  (0.9°	  ×	  0.9°)	  was	  continuously	  displayed.	  Stimuli	  were	  160	  grayscale	  photographs	  of	  cars	  (8.8°	  ×	  8.8°)	  and	  faces	  (7.4°	  ×	  7.4°),	  respectively.	  High-­‐resolution	  photographs	  of	  modern	  cars	  (no	  more	  than	  ~5	  years	  out	  of	  production)	  commonly	  seen	  on	  European	  streets	  were	  retrieved	  from	  the	  Internet.	  A	  car	  expert	  created	  80	  pairs	  of	  cars	  that	  he	  judged	  to	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  or	  different	  make	  or	  model	  based	  on	  perceptual	  similarities	  alone.	  There	  were	  40	  “same”	  pairs	  showing	  the	  same	  make	  and	  model	  which	  could	  appear	  in	  different	  positions	  and	  colors	  and	  could	  be	  from	  different	  years	  and	  series.	  Another	  40	  “different”	  pairs	  showed	  either	  same	  makes	  but	  different	  models	  (20	  pairs)	  or	  different	  makes	  and	  models	  (20	  pairs).	  In	  most	  car	  images,	  names	  or	  text	  and	  letters	  written	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  cars	  or	  on	  license	  plates	  were	  not	  visible.	  In	  a	  few	  images	  a	  brand	  logo	  appeared	  but	  the	  logo	  was	  never	  revealed	  on	  both	  cars	  in	  a	  pair.	  Face	  photographs	  were	  obtained	  from	  “The	  Database	  of	  Faces”	  created	  by	  the	  AT&T	  Laboratories	  Cambridge,	  UK	  (http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/attarchive/	  facedatabase.html).	  Faces	  were	  fit	  to	  a	  standard	  oval	  shape	  by	  cropping	  around	  the	  forehead,	  cheeks,	  and	  chin,	  omitting	  the	  hair	  and	  ears.	  Faces	  were	  Caucasian	  or	  mixed-­‐ethnicity,	  reflecting	  the	  major	  ethnicities	  of	  the	  participants	  of	  the	  current	  study.	  There	  were	  40	  “same”	  pairs	  showing	  two	  different	  images	  of	  the	  same	  person,	  and	  40	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“different”	  pairs	  showing	  different	  people	  matched	  by	  gender	  and	  hair	  color.	  For	  both	  cars	  and	  faces,	  inverted	  versions	  of	  the	  pairs	  were	  generated	  by	  rotating	  the	  images	  by	  180	  degrees.	  	  	   B-­‐CFS	  experiment.	  For	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment,	  observers	  viewed	  a	  19-­‐in	  CRT	  monitor	  (1280	  ×	  1024	  pixels	  resolution,	  100	  Hz	  refresh	  rate)	  dichoptically	  through	  a	  custom-­‐built	  mirror	  stereoscope.	  The	  observer’s	  head	  was	  stabilized	  by	  a	  chin-­‐and-­‐head	  rest	  at	  a	  viewing	  distance	  of	  approximately	  50	  cm.	  The	  mirrors	  of	  the	  stereoscope	  were	  adjusted	  for	  each	  observer	  to	  promote	  stable	  binocular	  fusion.	  The	  screen	  was	  black	  except	  for	  the	  uniform	  gray	  area	  in	  which	  the	  stimuli	  were	  presented.	  Two	  red	  frames	  (10.4°	  ×	  10.4°)	  were	  displayed	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  on	  the	  screen	  such	  that	  one	  frame	  was	  shown	  to	  each	  eye	  (distance	  between	  the	  centers	  of	  the	  two	  frames	  21.6°).	  To	  further	  support	  binocular	  fusion,	  noise	  contours	  (width	  0.5°)	  consisting	  of	  pixels	  with	  random	  intensities	  were	  presented	  within	  the	  red	  frames.	  In	  the	  center	  of	  each	  frame	  a	  red	  fixation	  dot	  (0.5°	  ×	  0.5°)	  with	  a	  black	  dot	  (0.2°	  ×	  0.2°)	  in	  its	  center	  was	  displayed	  (Figure	  1a).	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  maintain	  stable	  fixation	  throughout	  the	  experiment.	  Visual	  stimuli	  were	  presented	  with	  Matlab	  using	  the	  Cogent	  2000	  toolbox	  functions	  (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php).	  	   Target	  stimuli	  were	  40	  photographs	  of	  cars	  (3.6°	  ×	  1.1–2.2°),	  faces	  (2.1–3.0°	  ×	  3.1°),	  and	  chairs	  (1.7–2.8°	  ×	  3.6°),	  respectively.	  Car	  targets	  were	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  photographs	  used	  in	  the	  discrimination	  experiment	  (but	  now	  presented	  in	  gray	  scale	  and	  with	  lower	  contrast),	  faces	  were	  young	  Caucasians	  selected	  from	  the	  “Center	  for	  Vital	  Longevity	  Face	  Database”	  (Minear	  &	  Park,	  2004),	  and	  chairs	  were	  selected	  from	  the	  Internet.	  All	  stimuli	  were	  converted	  to	  gray	  scale	  and	  normalized	  for	  mean	  luminance	  and	  RMS	  contrast	  (see	  Figure	  1b).	  Different	  contrast	  settings	  were	  used	  for	  different	  object	  categories	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  approximately	  similar	  overall	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suppression	  times	  across	  categories	  (based	  on	  informal	  pilot	  testing).	  Note	  that	  because	  overall	  suppression	  times	  are	  influenced	  by	  various,	  partially	  unknown	  low-­‐level	  stimulus	  characteristics	  (Gray,	  Adams,	  Hedger,	  Newton,	  &	  Garner,	  2013;	  Meng,	  Cui,	  Zhou,	  Chen,	  &	  Ma,	  2012;	  Stein	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Stein,	  Seymour,	  Hebart,	  &	  Sterzer,	  2014;	  Stein	  &	  Sterzer,	  2012;	  Yang	  &	  Blake,	  2012)	  we	  do	  not	  interpret	  differences	  in	  overall	  suppression	  times	  but	  only	  compare	  suppression	  times	  for	  physically	  identical	  stimuli	  presented	  in	  upright	  and	  inverted	  orientations.	  For	  all	  120	  target	  stimuli,	  inverted	  versions	  were	  created	  by	  rotating	  the	  images	  by	  180	  degrees.	  	  	  To	  induce	  interocular	  suppression,	  we	  created	  high-­‐contrast,	  contour-­‐rich	  CFS	  masks	  (9.2°	  ×	  9.2°)	  consisting	  of	  randomly	  arranged	  white,	  black,	  and	  gray	  circles	  (diameter	  0.4°–1.8°;	  see	  Figure	  1a)	  using	  Matlab	  code	  available	  online	  (http://martin-­‐hebart.de/code/make_mondrian_masks.m).	  
Procedure	  
Discrimination	  experiment.	  After	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment	  (see	  below),	  participants	  completed	  separate	  blocks	  of	  car	  and	  face	  sequential	  matching	  tasks.	  On	  each	  trial,	  a	  stimulus	  appeared	  for	  1	  s	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  screen,	  and	  after	  a	  fixation-­‐only	  period	  of	  500	  ms	  a	  second	  stimulus	  remained	  on	  the	  screen	  until	  response.	  Participants	  responded	  by	  pressing	  the	  “1”	  key	  on	  the	  number	  pad	  if	  they	  believed	  the	  two	  stimuli	  depicted	  the	  same	  car	  model	  (car	  block)	  or	  the	  same	  person	  (face	  block)	  and	  the	  “2”	  key	  if	  they	  believed	  the	  two	  stimuli	  were	  different.	  They	  were	  instructed	  to	  respond	  as	  accurately	  as	  possible,	  without	  speed	  pressure.	  Both	  the	  car	  and	  the	  face	  blocks	  contained	  160	  trials,	  in	  which	  each	  of	  the	  80	  stimulus	  pairs	  (40	  “same”,	  40	  “different”)	  was	  shown	  twice,	  once	  in	  upright	  and	  once	  in	  inverted	  orientation.	  Upright	  and	  inverted	  trials	  were	  intermixed	  and	  trial	  order	  was	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randomized.	  All	  participants	  first	  completed	  the	  car	  discrimination	  block	  and	  then	  the	  face	  discrimination	  block.	  	  
B-­‐CFS	  experiment.	  Before	  the	  discrimination	  experiments	  participants	  performed	  a	  standard	  b-­‐CFS	  localization	  task:	  After	  a	  700-­‐ms	  period	  with	  no	  fixation	  dot	  and	  a	  700-­‐ms	  fixation	  period,	  CFS	  masks	  updated	  at	  10	  Hz	  were	  shown	  to	  one	  randomly	  selected	  eye,	  while	  a	  photograph	  of	  a	  target	  object	  was	  gradually	  introduced	  to	  the	  other	  eye	  by	  increasing	  its	  contrast	  over	  the	  first	  second	  of	  each	  trial.	  Beginning	  one	  second	  after	  trial	  onset,	  the	  contrast	  of	  the	  CFS	  masks	  was	  linearly	  decreased	  to	  zero	  over	  7.9	  s.	  The	  target	  stimulus	  was	  presented	  until	  response,	  or	  for	  a	  maximum	  trial	  length	  of	  10	  s.	  Target	  stimuli	  were	  presented	  in	  one	  of	  the	  quadrants	  of	  the	  fusion	  contour,	  centered	  at	  an	  eccentricity	  of	  3.3°.	  Participants	  were	  informed	  about	  the	  presentation	  of	  upright	  and	  inverted	  car,	  chair,	  and	  face	  targets,	  and	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  press	  one	  of	  four	  keys	  on	  a	  QWERTY	  keyboard	  corresponding	  to	  the	  four	  quadrants	  (“F”	  or	  “V”	  with	  their	  left	  hand	  and	  “J”	  or	  “N”	  with	  their	  right	  hand)	  to	  indicate	  as	  fast	  and	  accurately	  as	  possible	  in	  which	  quadrant	  a	  target	  object	  or	  any	  part	  of	  a	  target	  object	  emerged	  from	  suppression.	  No	  object	  recognition	  or	  discrimination	  was	  required	  for	  this	  task.	  	   The	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  240	  trials	  (separated	  by	  mandatory	  breaks	  after	  80	  and	  160	  trials)	  in	  which	  each	  combination	  of	  three	  target	  object	  categories,	  two	  target	  orientations,	  and	  40	  target	  exemplars	  per	  category	  occurred	  once.	  The	  eye	  to	  which	  the	  target	  object	  was	  presented	  was	  randomized	  such	  that	  half	  of	  the	  targets	  from	  each	  category	  were	  presented	  to	  one	  eye	  and	  the	  other	  half	  to	  the	  other	  eye,	  with	  the	  constraint	  that	  both	  the	  upright	  and	  the	  inverted	  versions	  of	  a	  specific	  target	  stimulus	  were	  presented	  to	  the	  same	  eye.	  Target	  locations	  were	  randomized	  with	  the	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constraint	  that	  for	  each	  of	  the	  six	  conditions	  (three	  target	  categories	  ×	  two	  target	  orientations),	  each	  quadrant	  was	  selected	  ten	  times.	  Finally,	  trial	  order	  was	  randomized.	  
Analyses	  For	  the	  discrimination	  experiment,	  hit	  rates	  (proportion	  of	  “different”	  responses	  when	  two	  different	  exemplars	  were	  presented	  sequentially)	  and	  false	  alarm	  rates	  (proportion	  of	  “different”	  responses	  when	  the	  same	  exemplar	  was	  presented	  sequentially)	  were	  z-­‐transformed	  and	  converted	  to	  the	  sensitivity	  measure	  d’	  (applying	  the	  1/(2N)	  rule	  for	  rates	  of	  zero	  or	  one	  (Macmillan	  &	  Kaplan,	  1985)).	  Discrimination	  sensitivity	  for	  upright	  stimuli	  in	  these	  sequential	  matching	  experiments	  was	  taken	  as	  the	  measure	  of	  perceptual	  expertise	  for	  cars	  and	  faces,	  respectively	  (e.g.	  Gauthier	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  McGugin	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Inversion	  effects	  for	  cars	  and	  faces	  were	  computed	  as	  the	  difference	  in	  discrimination	  sensitivity	  between	  upright	  and	  inverted	  stimuli.	  	  For	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment,	  only	  trials	  with	  correct	  localization	  responses	  (M	  =	  98.4%,	  SD	  =	  1.8%)	  were	  included	  in	  the	  analyses	  of	  suppression	  times.	  A	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  factors	  category	  (cars,	  chairs,	  faces)	  and	  orientation	  (upright,	  inverted)	  revealed	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  localization	  accuracy,	  all	  p	  >	  .397.	  Suppression	  times	  were	  first	  analyzed	  using	  an	  omnibus	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  factors	  category	  and	  orientation.	  Post-­‐hoc	  paired	  t-­‐tests	  were	  then	  carried	  out	  to	  test	  whether	  inversion	  significantly	  prolonged	  suppression	  times	  for	  each	  category	  and	  whether	  the	  effect	  of	  inversion	  differed	  between	  individual	  object	  categories.	  	  Inversion	  effects	  obtained	  in	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment	  were	  then	  correlated	  with	  sensitivity	  scores	  from	  the	  discrimination	  experiment,	  separately	  for	  cars	  and	  faces.	  We	  conducted	  two	  correlation	  analyses	  for	  each	  category,	  testing	  for	  positive	  correlations	  between	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  and	  overall	  discrimination	  sensitivity	  for	  upright	  cars	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and	  faces	  and	  for	  positive	  correlations	  between	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  and	  inversion	  effects	  in	  discrimination	  sensitivities.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  clear	  directional	  hypothesis	  regarding	  the	  influence	  of	  inversion	  on	  suppression	  times	  (shorter	  for	  upright	  target	  objects)	  and	  discrimination	  sensitivity	  (better	  for	  upright	  objects),	  inversion	  effects	  were	  assessed	  with	  one-­‐tailed	  tests.	  For	  the	  comparison	  of	  inversion	  effects	  between	  object	  categories,	  we	  used	  two-­‐tailed	  tests.	  Finally,	  due	  to	  the	  clear	  directionality	  of	  our	  hypothesis	  and	  to	  maximize	  power,	  to	  test	  for	  positive	  correlations	  between	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  and	  discrimination	  sensitivity	  scores	  we	  used	  one-­‐tailed	  tests	  (Gauthier,	  Curby,	  Skudlarski,	  &	  Epstein,	  2005;	  McGugin,	  Van	  Gulick,	  Tamber-­‐Rosenau,	  Ross,	  &	  Gauthier,	  2014).1	  	  	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Discrimination	  Experiment	  	   A	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  factors	  category	  (cars,	  faces)	  and	  orientation	  (upright,	  inverted)	  on	  the	  d’	  scores	  from	  the	  discrimination	  tasks	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  category,	  F(1,	  29)	  =	  22.36,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .44,	  with	  higher	  performance	  for	  faces	  (M	  =	  1.56)	  than	  for	  cars	  (M	  =	  0.90).	  The	  relatively	  low	  performance	  for	  cars	  reflects	  our	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  challenging	  task	  sensitive	  to	  interindividual	  differences	  in	  car	  discrimination	  performance	  in	  our	  sample	  of	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts.	  Note	  that	  we	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  match	  overall	  performance	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One-­‐tailed	  test	  were	  deemed	  appropriate	  because	  no	  significant	  correlation	  as	  well	  as	  a	  significant	  correlation	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  (negative	  correlation	  between	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  and	  discrimination	  sensitivity)	  would	  both	  have	  been	  regarded	  as	  no	  evidence	  for	  a	  relationship	  between	  expertise	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects.	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faces	  and	  cars,	  because	  we	  were	  interested	  in	  performance	  differences	  within	  these	  categories	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  orientation	  was	  also	  significant,	  F(1,	  29)	  =	  132.29,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .82,	  reflecting	  greater	  discrimination	  sensitivity	  for	  upright	  (M	  =	  1.67)	  than	  for	  inverted	  (M	  =	  0.79)	  stimuli.	  The	  category-­‐by-­‐orientation	  interaction	  was	  not	  significant,	  F(1,	  29)	  =	  0.92,	  p	  =	  .346,	  ηp2	  =	  .03,	  meaning	  that	  the	  size	  of	  the	  inversion	  effect	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  between	  cars	  (M	  =	  0.95)	  and	  faces	  (M	  =	  0.81;	  see	  Figure	  2b).	  	  While	  several	  previous	  studies	  found	  an	  effect	  of	  inversion	  on	  the	  discrimination	  of	  objects	  from	  categories	  other	  than	  faces,	  even	  in	  novices,	  these	  inversion	  effects	  were	  usually	  of	  much	  smaller	  magnitude	  than	  those	  obtained	  for	  faces	  (e.g.	  Busigny	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Robbins	  &	  McKone,	  2007;	  Rossion	  &	  Curran,	  2010;	  Valentine	  &	  Bruce,	  1986;	  Yin,	  1969).	  To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  car	  inversion	  effects	  of	  comparable	  numerical	  magnitude	  as	  in	  the	  present	  experiment	  were	  previously	  reported	  by	  only	  two	  studies	  on	  car	  experts	  (Gauthier	  et	  al.,	  2000,	  d’	  difference	  0.84;	  Xu	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  d’	  difference	  0.87).	  Thus,	  these	  large	  car	  inversion	  effects	  provide	  an	  a	  posteriori	  validation	  that	  our	  participants	  were,	  on	  average,	  car	  experts.	  To	  further	  assess	  whether	  our	  participants	  were	  indeed	  car	  experts,	  we	  compared	  discrimination	  performance	  to	  an	  independent	  sample	  of	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  novices	  (N	  =	  13,	  seven	  females,	  six	  males,	  mean	  age	  28.4	  years,	  SD	  =	  5.1	  years).	  A	  mixed	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  factors	  group	  (self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts,	  novices),	  category	  (cars,	  faces)	  and	  orientation	  (upright,	  inverted)	  on	  the	  d’	  scores	  yielded	  a	  three-­‐way	  interaction,	  F(1,	  41)	  =	  10.46,	  p	  =	  .002,	  ηp2	  =	  .20.	  For	  faces,	  neither	  overall	  performance	  (experts,	  M	  =	  1.56,	  novices,	  M	  =	  1.75;	  F(1,	  41)	  =	  1.91,	  p	  =	  .175,	  ηp2	  =	  .04)	  nor	  inversion	  effects	  (experts,	  M	  =	  0.81,	  novices,	  M	  =	  1.03;	  F(1,	  41)	  =	  1.18,	  p	  =	  .284,	  ηp2	  =	  .03)	  differed	  significantly	  between	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts	  and	  novices.	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For	  cars,	  by	  contrast,	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts	  had	  significantly	  greater	  discrimination	  sensitivity	  (experts,	  M	  =	  0.90,	  novices,	  M	  =	  −0.25;	  F(1,	  41)	  =	  23.14,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .36),	  and	  inversion	  effects	  (experts,	  M	  =	  0.95,	  novices,	  M	  =	  −0.24;	  F(1,	  41)	  =	  14.55,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .26)	  than	  novices.	  These	  results	  confirm	  that	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts	  who	  took	  part	  in	  the	  present	  study	  had	  indeed	  had	  greater	  car	  expertise	  than	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  novices.	  
B-­‐CFS	  Experiment	  For	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  experiments	  we	  only	  tested	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts	  to	  avoid	  selection	  biases	  and	  to	  exclude	  potential	  confounds	  related	  to	  comparing	  experts	  and	  novices	  (e.g.	  differences	  in	  overall	  motivation	  or	  vigilance).	  Mean	  suppression	  times	  from	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment	  (see	  Figure	  2a)	  were	  analyzed	  in	  a	  repeated-­‐measures	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  factors	  category	  (cars,	  chairs,	  faces)	  and	  orientation	  (upright,	  inverted).	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  category	  was	  significant,	  F(2,	  58)	  =	  12.59,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .30,	  reflecting	  overall	  shorter	  suppression	  times	  for	  faces	  (M	  =	  5.96	  s)	  than	  for	  cars	  (M	  =	  6.25	  s)	  and	  for	  chairs	  (M	  =	  6.35	  s).	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  orientation	  was	  also	  significant,	  
F(1,	  29)	  =	  21.44,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .43,	  with	  overall	  shorter	  suppression	  times	  for	  upright	  targets	  (M	  =	  6.08	  s)	  than	  for	  inverted	  targets	  (M	  =	  6.29	  s).	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  interaction	  between	  category	  and	  orientation	  was	  significant,	  F(2,	  58)	  =	  5.41,	  p	  =	  .007,	  ηp2	  =	  .16.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  Figure	  2a,	  inversion	  significantly	  prolonged	  suppression	  times	  for	  faces,	  t(29)	  =	  4.87,	  p	  <	  .001,	  one-­‐tailed,	  d	  =	  0.89.	  A	  statistically	  significant	  inversion	  effect	  was	  also	  found	  for	  cars,	  t(29)	  =	  2.08,	  p	  =	  .024,	  one-­‐tailed,	  d	  =	  0.38,	  but	  not	  for	  chairs,	  t(29)	  =	  1.11,	  p	  =	  .137,	  one-­‐tailed,	  d	  =	  0.20.	  Furthermore,	  the	  face	  inversion	  effect	  was	  significantly	  larger	  than	  the	  effect	  of	  inversion	  on	  suppression	  times	  for	  cars,	  
t(29)	  =	  2.64,	  p	  =	  .013,	  two-­‐tailed,	  d	  =	  0.48,	  and	  for	  chairs,	  t(29)	  =	  2.80,	  p	  =	  .009,	  two-­‐tailed,	  d	  =	  0.51.	  Finally,	  the	  effect	  of	  inversion	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  between	  cars	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and	  chairs,	  t	  <	  1.	  While	  the	  larger	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effect	  for	  faces	  compared	  to	  other	  object	  categories	  replicates	  previous	  findings	  (Stein	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Zhou	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  the	  statistically	  significant	  advantage	  for	  upright	  over	  inverted	  cars	  in	  breaking	  suppression	  indicates	  that	  in	  self-­‐proclaimed	  experts	  orientation	  can	  modulate	  access	  to	  awareness	  also	  for	  objects	  from	  their	  category	  of	  expertise.	  As	  previous	  b-­‐CFS	  studies	  did	  not	  find	  statistically	  significant	  inversion	  effects	  for	  inanimate	  object	  categories	  (Stein	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Zhou	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  this	  inversion	  effect	  for	  cars	  provides	  a	  first	  indication	  that	  expertise	  may	  be	  related	  to	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects.	  Next,	  we	  directly	  related	  individual	  differences	  in	  perceptual	  expertise	  to	  inversion	  effects	  obtained	  with	  b-­‐CFS.	  
Correlation	  Analyses	  	   First,	  we	  tested	  the	  association	  between	  car	  inversion	  effects	  from	  b-­‐CFS	  and	  overall	  car	  discrimination	  ability,	  using	  sensitivity	  scores	  for	  upright	  cars	  as	  the	  measure	  of	  expertise	  (e.g.,	  Gauthier	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  McGugin	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  As	  shown	  by	  Figure	  3a,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  positive	  correlation	  between	  d'	  scores	  for	  upright	  cars	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  for	  cars,	  r(28)	  =	  .419,	  p	  =	  .011,	  one-­‐tailed.	  Thus,	  car	  expertise	  was	  associated	  with	  larger	  car	  inversion	  effects	  in	  b-­‐CFS,	  indicating	  that	  perceptual	  expertise	  results	  in	  configural	  processing	  of	  objects	  in	  access	  to	  awareness.	  Second,	  we	  analyzed	  the	  relationship	  between	  car	  inversion	  effects	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  and	  inversion	  effects	  in	  car	  discrimination	  sensitivity.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  Figure	  3b,	  the	  correlation	  between	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  for	  cars	  was	  significant,	  r(28)	  =	  .401,	  p	  =	  .014,	  one-­‐tailed.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  a	  link	  between	  configural	  processing	  in	  exemplar-­‐level	  identification	  and	  configural	  processing	  in	  conscious	  access	  for	  objects	  of	  expertise.	  	   We	  then	  repeated	  these	  analyses	  for	  faces.	  Similar	  to	  cars,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  positive	  correlation	  between	  d’	  scores	  for	  upright	  faces	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  face	  inversion	  effects,	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r(28)	  =	  .366,	  p	  =	  .023,	  one	  tailed	  (see	  Figure	  4a),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	  face	  inversion	  effects	  from	  the	  sequential	  matching	  task	  and	  the	  face	  inversion	  effects	  obtained	  with	  b-­‐CFS,	  r(28)	  =	  .364,	  p	  =	  .024,	  one-­‐tailed	  (Figure	  4b).	  Thus,	  also	  for	  this	  natural	  category	  of	  expertise,	  recognition	  skills	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  configural	  processing	  in	  identification	  are	  related	  to	  configural	  processing	  in	  access	  to	  awareness.	  	  
Category-­‐specificity	  	   To	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	  these	  correlations	  were	  due	  to	  a	  more	  general	  cognitive	  process	  unrelated	  to	  category-­‐specific	  perceptual	  expertise,	  we	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  control	  analyses.	  First,	  we	  tested	  for	  cross-­‐category	  correlations	  between	  cars	  and	  faces.	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  of	  b-­‐CFS	  car	  inversion	  effects	  with	  upright	  face	  discrimination,	  r(28)	  =	  .068,	  p	  =	  .361,	  one-­‐tailed,	  or	  with	  face	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects,	  r(28)	  =	  .076,	  p	  =	  .346,	  one-­‐tailed.	  Similarly,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  of	  b-­‐CFS	  face	  inversion	  effects	  with	  upright	  car	  discrimination,	  r(28)	  =	  .182,	  p	  =	  .168,	  one-­‐tailed,	  or	  with	  car	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects,	  r(28)	  =	  −.051,	  p	  =	  .395,	  one-­‐tailed.	  Second,	  we	  tested	  whether	  discrimination	  abilities	  for	  cars	  and	  faces	  correlated	  with	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  for	  chairs.	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  between	  d'	  scores	  for	  upright	  cars	  or	  car	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  for	  chairs,	  r(28)	  =	  −.283,	  p	  =	  .065,	  one-­‐tailed,	  and	  	  r(28)	  =	  −.146,	  p	  =	  .220,	  one-­‐tailed,	  respectively.	  Similarly,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  between	  upright	  face	  discrimination	  or	  face	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  chair	  inversion	  effects,	  r(28)	  =	  −.190,	  p	  =	  .157,	  one-­‐tailed,	  and	  	  r(28)	  =	  −.210,	  p	  =	  .132,	  one-­‐tailed,	  respectively.	  Third,	  we	  tested	  whether	  the	  correlations	  between	  discrimination	  abilities	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  for	  cars	  and	  faces	  persisted	  when	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effect	  for	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chairs	  was	  subtracted.	  Also	  with	  this	  analysis	  there	  were	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  of	  b-­‐CFS	  car	  inversion	  effects	  from	  which	  b-­‐CFS	  chair	  inversion	  effects	  were	  subtracted	  with	  d’	  scores	  for	  upright	  cars,	  r(28)	  =	  .512,	  p	  =	  .002,	  one	  tailed,	  and	  with	  car	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects,	  r(28)	  =	  .400,	  p	  =	  .014,	  one	  tailed.	  Similarly,	  there	  were	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  of	  b-­‐CFS	  face	  inversion	  effects	  from	  which	  b-­‐CFS	  chair	  inversion	  effects	  were	  subtracted	  with	  upright	  face	  discrimination,	  r(28)	  =	  .377,	  p	  =	  .020,	  one	  tailed,	  and	  with	  face	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects,	  r(28)	  =	  .388,	  p	  =	  .017,	  one	  tailed.	  Finally,	  we	  computed	  partial	  correlations	  between	  discrimination	  performance	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  for	  cars	  and	  faces,	  controlling	  both	  for	  discrimination	  performance	  for	  the	  other	  category	  and	  for	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  for	  chairs.	  There	  were	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  of	  b-­‐CFS	  car	  inversion	  effects	  with	  upright	  car	  discrimination,	  r(26)	  =	  .453,	  p	  =	  .008,	  one-­‐tailed,	  controlling	  for	  upright	  face	  discrimination	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  chair	  inversion	  effects,	  and	  with	  car	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects,	  r(26)	  =	  .417,	  p	  =	  .014,	  one-­‐tailed,	  controlling	  for	  face	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  chair	  inversion	  effects.	  Similarly,	  there	  were	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  of	  b-­‐CFS	  face	  inversion	  effects	  with	  upright	  face	  discrimination,	  r(26)	  =	  .323,	  p	  =	  .047,	  one-­‐tailed,	  controlling	  for	  upright	  car	  discrimination	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  chair	  inversion	  effects,	  and	  with	  face	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects,	  r(26)	  =	  .346,	  p	  =	  .035,	  one-­‐tailed,	  controlling	  for	  car	  discrimination	  inversion	  effects	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  chair	  inversion	  effects.	  	  Thus,	  these	  control	  analyses	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  correlations	  between	  discrimination	  performance	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  are	  category-­‐specific,	  do	  not	  generalize	  to	  chairs,	  and	  persist	  when	  perceptual	  performance	  for	  other	  categories	  is	  partialled	  out.	  These	  results	  provide	  evidence	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	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discrimination	  skills	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  for	  cars	  and	  faces	  reflects	  category-­‐specific	  perceptual	  expertise	  rather	  than	  a	  more	  general	  cognitive	  process.	  	  	  
General	  Discussion	  The	  present	  study	  tested	  whether	  privileged	  access	  to	  awareness	  is	  mediated	  by	  perceptual	  expertise.	  We	  recruited	  a	  sample	  of	  self-­‐proclaimed	  car	  experts	  who	  varied	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  objectively	  assessed	  car	  and	  face	  expertise	  and	  measured	  the	  time	  upright	  and	  inverted	  photographs	  of	  faces,	  cars,	  and	  chairs	  needed	  to	  overcome	  CFS	  and	  break	  into	  awareness.	  Consistent	  with	  previous	  research	  (Stein	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Zhou	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  the	  advantage	  of	  upright	  over	  inverted	  stimuli	  in	  breaking	  CFS	  (b-­‐CFS)	  was	  larger	  for	  faces	  than	  for	  cars	  and	  chairs.	  Importantly,	  however,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  car	  inversion	  effect	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  varied	  as	  a	  function	  of	  perceptual	  expertise	  for	  cars:	  Greater	  car	  expertise	  was	  associated	  with	  larger	  car	  inversion	  effects	  in	  b-­‐CFS.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  evidence	  that	  discrimination	  expertise	  is	  related	  to	  configural	  processing	  underlying	  conscious	  access.	  Indeed,	  we	  found	  that	  larger	  effects	  of	  inversion	  in	  car	  discrimination	  were	  associated	  with	  larger	  car	  inversion	  effects	  in	  b-­‐CFS,	  indicating	  that	  these	  two	  tasks	  recruit	  similar	  or	  shared	  configural	  mechanisms.	  Finally,	  a	  similar	  association	  between	  identification	  performance	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  was	  found	  for	  faces,	  providing	  further	  evidence	  for	  shared	  configural	  processing	  mechanisms	  underlying	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination	  and	  access	  to	  visual	  awareness.	  
Inversion	  Effects	  for	  Objects	  of	  Expertise	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  With	  this	  breaking	  CFS	  (b-­‐CFS)	  method,	  previous	  work	  had	  shown	  that	  upright	  faces	  and	  bodies	  have	  an	  advantage	  over	  inverted	  faces	  and	  bodies	  in	  accessing	  visual	  awareness	  and	  that	  these	  inversion	  effects	  are	  much	  larger	  for	  faces	  and	  bodies	  than	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  familiar	  animate	  and	  inanimate	  object	  categories	  (Stein	  et	  al.,	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2012;	  Zhou	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  This	  particular	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  upright	  configuration	  of	  faces	  and	  bodies	  may	  reflect	  either	  a	  domain-­‐specific,	  inborn	  detection	  mechanism	  (Johnson,	  2005;	  McKone	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  or	  our	  extensive	  experience	  in	  recognizing	  and	  individuating	  other	  people	  (Diamond	  &	  Carey,	  1986;	  Gauthier	  &	  Tarr,	  1997,	  2002).	  The	  association	  between	  better	  car	  and	  face	  identification	  and	  larger	  inversion	  effects	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  obtained	  in	  the	  present	  study	  now	  provides	  more	  evidence	  that	  the	  perceptual	  mechanisms	  governing	  access	  to	  visual	  awareness	  are	  shaped	  by	  expertise.	  While	  these	  findings	  do	  not	  categorically	  rule	  out	  an	  additional	  contribution	  of	  inborn	  mechanisms	  to	  the	  detection	  of	  conspecifics	  (Farroni	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Johnson	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Simion,	  Regolin,	  &	  Bulf,	  2008;	  Stein	  et	  al.,	  2011b,	  2012),	  they	  demonstrate	  that	  perceptual	  expertise	  alone	  can	  influence	  conscious	  access	  for	  the	  category	  of	  expertise.	  It	  is	  currently	  debated	  whether	  such	  access	  prioritization	  as	  measured	  with	  b-­‐CFS	  reflects	  non-­‐conscious	  processing	  that	  is	  specifically	  tied	  to	  the	  technique	  of	  interocular	  suppression	  or	  the	  visual	  system’s	  sensitivity	  to	  different	  stimulus	  categories	  more	  generally.	  The	  present	  findings	  could	  therefore	  reflect	  differences	  in	  general	  detectability	  between	  upright	  and	  inverted	  stimuli	  that	  vary	  with	  the	  observer’s	  discrimination	  expertise.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  such	  increased	  sensitivity	  in	  simple	  detection	  implies	  enhanced	  visual	  processing	  before	  stimuli	  become	  available	  for	  conscious	  access,	  which	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  form	  of	  non-­‐conscious	  visual	  processing	  (e.g.	  Kaunitz,	  Fracasso,	  Lingnau,	  &	  Melcher,	  2013;	  Stein,	  Kaiser,	  &	  Peelen,	  2015).	  We	  interpret	  our	  findings	  as	  indicating	  that	  perceptual	  expertise	  is	  associated	  with	  increased	  sensitivity	  to	  configural	  stimulus	  properties,	  resulting	  in	  privileged	  access	  to	  awareness	  for	  objects	  of	  expertise.	  This	  increased	  sensitivity	  boosts	  access	  to	  awareness	  under	  CFS	  and	  may	  also	  increase	  detectability	  more	  generally,	  independent	  of	  the	  specific	  technique	  of	  interocular	  suppression.	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Several	  previous	  b-­‐CFS	  studies	  compared	  effects	  obtained	  under	  CFS	  to	  control	  conditions	  not	  involving	  interocular	  suppression	  to	  rule	  out	  possible	  response	  biases	  and	  to	  infer	  CFS-­‐specific	  non-­‐conscious	  processing.	  Because	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  issues	  with	  relying	  on	  such	  control	  conditions	  (see	  Gayet	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Stein	  et	  al.,	  2011a;	  Stein	  &	  Sterzer,	  2014;	  Yang,	  Brascamp,	  Kang,	  &	  Blake,	  2014),	  here	  we	  did	  not	  include	  such	  a	  binocular	  control	  condition.	  While	  a	  contribution	  of	  response	  biases	  to	  the	  present	  findings	  cannot	  be	  excluded,	  this	  possibility	  seems	  unlikely	  given	  that	  correlations	  were	  computed	  between	  inversion	  effects	  from	  b-­‐CFS	  (rather	  than	  overall	  suppression	  times	  for	  upright	  stimuli)	  and	  criterion-­‐free	  indices	  of	  discrimination	  sensitivity.	  	  
Expertise	  Enhances	  Configural	  Processing	  in	  Conscious	  Access	  The	  enhanced	  perceptual	  sensitivity	  related	  to	  expertise	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  research	  showing	  faster	  categorization	  of	  objects	  of	  expertise	  in	  visual	  search	  arrays	  (Hershler	  &	  Hochstein,	  2009)	  and	  in	  real-­‐world	  scenes	  (Reeder	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  The	  current	  results	  extend	  these	  previous	  findings	  in	  two	  important	  ways:	  First,	  the	  method	  of	  b-­‐CFS	  taps	  a	  more	  basic	  level	  of	  visual	  processing.	  In	  previous	  studies,	  participants	  were	  faster	  in	  categorizing	  an	  object	  presented	  among	  distractors	  as	  a	  target	  when	  this	  object	  was	  from	  their	  category	  of	  expertise	  and	  distractors	  were	  from	  other	  object	  categories.	  That	  is,	  in	  these	  studies	  the	  category	  of	  the	  target	  object	  needed	  to	  be	  discriminated	  from	  the	  category	  of	  simultaneously	  presented	  distractor	  objects.	  Thus,	  better	  categorization	  might	  have	  reflected	  more	  efficient	  top-­‐down	  attentional	  guidance	  toward	  the	  category	  of	  expertise.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  present	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment	  no	  such	  selection	  requirements	  existed;	  the	  target	  category	  was	  not	  cued	  and	  indeed	  not	  even	  directly	  relevant	  to	  the	  task.	  Participants	  simply	  needed	  to	  discriminate	  a	  single	  target	  object	  presented	  to	  one	  eye	  from	  the	  CFS	  masks	  presented	  to	  the	  other	  eye	  in	  order	  to	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localize	  the	  initially	  invisible	  target.	  Thus,	  differences	  in	  the	  efficiency	  of	  top-­‐down	  attentional	  guidance	  are	  unlikely	  to	  explain	  the	  effect	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  Rather,	  the	  current	  results	  indicate	  that	  representations	  of	  objects	  of	  expertise	  can	  be	  enhanced	  even	  before	  they	  become	  available	  for	  conscious	  access,	  thus	  demonstrating	  that	  expertise	  can	  modulate	  processing	  throughout	  the	  visual	  hierarchy.	  Second,	  while	  previous	  studies	  found	  a	  general	  advantage	  for	  upright	  objects	  of	  expertise	  over	  upright	  objects	  from	  other	  categories	  (Hershler	  &	  Hochstein,	  2009;	  Reeder	  et	  al.,	  2015),	  here	  we	  studied	  the	  relationship	  between	  expertise	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  inversion	  on	  suppression	  times	  obtained	  with	  b-­‐CFS.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  it	  allowed	  us	  to	  more	  precisely	  determine	  the	  type	  of	  non-­‐conscious	  stimulus	  representations	  that	  are	  modulated	  by	  perceptual	  expertise.	  As	  all	  image-­‐level	  features	  are	  identical	  in	  upright	  and	  inverted	  stimuli,	  our	  findings	  indicate	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  of	  experts	  is	  specifically	  tuned	  to	  the	  upright	  orientation	  of	  objects	  from	  their	  category	  of	  expertise	  rather	  than	  to	  isolated	  diagnostic	  features	  or	  parts	  (e.g.	  the	  wheel	  of	  a	  car).	  Most	  commonly,	  inversion	  is	  believed	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  visual	  system’s	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  normal	  upright	  spatial	  configuration	  of	  object	  parts	  (Curby	  &	  Gauthier,	  2010;	  Diamond	  &	  Carey,	  1986).	  While	  previous	  studies	  revealed	  larger	  inversion	  effects	  for	  objects	  of	  expertise	  in	  discrimination	  tasks	  (e.g.,	  Curby	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Diamond	  &	  Carey,	  1986;	  Gauthier	  et	  al.,	  1998,	  2000;	  Rossion	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Xu	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  hence	  demonstrating	  enhanced	  configural	  processing	  for	  objects	  of	  expertise	  in	  these	  tasks,	  the	  present	  findings	  are	  the	  first	  demonstration	  that	  perceptual	  expertise	  is	  related	  to	  enhanced	  configural	  processing	  in	  conscious	  access.	  	  This	  relationship	  between	  identification	  and	  inversion	  effects	  in	  access	  to	  awareness	  was	  category-­‐specific:	  The	  relative	  level	  of	  discrimination	  performance	  for	  a	  specific	  category	  (cars,	  faces)	  predicted	  the	  size	  of	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effect	  for	  that	  
AWARENESS	  FOR	  OBJECTS	  OF	  EXPERTISE	   	   25	  
category,	  but	  not	  for	  the	  other	  category,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  This	  category-­‐specificity	  indicates	  that	  our	  findings	  are	  specifically	  tied	  to	  perceptual	  expertise	  rather	  than	  to	  a	  more	  general	  cognitive	  process.	  One	  limitation	  of	  the	  present	  approach	  is	  that	  performance	  in	  the	  discrimination	  task	  may	  not	  represent	  a	  pure	  measure	  of	  perceptual	  expertise.	  Although	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination	  ability	  represents	  the	  standard	  index	  and	  operationalization	  of	  perceptual	  expertise,	  factors	  other	  than	  expertise	  may	  also	  influence	  performance	  on	  this	  task.	  To	  isolate	  the	  role	  of	  perceptual	  expertise,	  discrimination	  skills	  would	  need	  to	  be	  examined	  for	  an	  additional	  object	  category	  (e.g.,	  chairs)	  for	  which	  observers	  do	  not	  differ	  in	  expertise.	  This	  would	  rely	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  no	  meaningful	  differences	  in	  perceptual	  expertise	  exist	  for	  this	  additional	  object	  category.	  However,	  even	  novices	  may	  show	  variability	  in	  perceptual	  expertise,	  such	  that	  a	  positive	  correlation	  (e.g.,	  for	  chairs)	  could	  similarly	  reflect	  differences	  in	  expertise.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  methods	  to	  separate	  distinct	  sources	  of	  variance	  that	  influence	  discrimination	  performance,	  it	  thus	  remains	  possible	  that	  the	  correlations	  between	  identification	  and	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effects	  reflect	  additional	  factors	  unrelated	  to	  expertise.	  	  
Similar	  Perceptual	  Mechanisms	  for	  Identification	  and	  Access	  to	  Awareness	  The	  fact	  that	  perceptual	  expertise	  is	  associated	  with	  larger	  inversion	  effects	  in	  both	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination	  tasks	  and	  in	  conscious	  detection	  suggests	  that	  these	  two	  distinct	  tasks	  recruit	  partly	  overlapping	  perceptual	  mechanisms.	  Indeed,	  we	  found	  that	  for	  both	  cars	  and	  faces	  the	  inversion	  effect	  in	  discrimination	  performance	  was	  correlated	  with	  the	  size	  of	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  inversion	  effect.	  This	  correlation	  between	  configural	  processing	  (as	  captured	  by	  inversion	  effects)	  may	  seem	  surprising,	  because	  the	  two	  tasks	  rely	  on	  fundamentally	  different	  abilities:	  Whereas	  successful	  identification	  requires	  the	  ability	  to	  distinguish	  subtle	  differences	  among	  exemplars	  
AWARENESS	  FOR	  OBJECTS	  OF	  EXPERTISE	   	   26	  
within	  an	  object	  category,	  successful	  detection	  requires	  the	  ability	  to	  generalize	  across	  exemplars.	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  for	  objects	  of	  expertise	  both	  detection	  and	  discrimination	  are	  achieved	  through	  view-­‐invariant,	  holistic	  templates	  (Hershler	  &	  Hochstein,	  2009).	  Indeed,	  the	  “experience-­‐based	  holistic	  account”	  of	  face	  perception	  by	  Rossion	  and	  Michel	  (2011)	  proposes	  that	  for	  faces,	  recognition	  is	  achieved	  by	  matching	  an	  experience-­‐derived	  template	  representing	  the	  global	  structure	  of	  an	  average	  face	  to	  the	  visual	  input.	  This	  account	  has	  not	  only	  been	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  impact	  of	  experience	  on	  configural	  face	  processing	  in	  discrimination	  tasks	  but	  also	  to	  account	  for	  the	  finding	  that	  the	  face	  inversion	  effect	  in	  b-­‐CFS	  is	  larger	  for	  faces	  from	  the	  observer’s	  own	  race	  and	  age	  group	  (Stein	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  expertise	  with	  another	  object	  category	  such	  as	  cars	  may	  entail	  the	  development	  of	  an	  experience-­‐shaped	  holistic	  template	  for	  that	  category	  that	  supports	  both	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination	  and	  conscious	  detection.	  An	  important	  question	  for	  future	  research	  is	  to	  determine	  how	  such	  a	  single	  template	  could	  be	  dynamically	  scaled	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  both	  fine-­‐grained	  discrimination	  at	  the	  fovea	  and	  detection	  over	  the	  whole	  visual	  field	  (cf.	  Hershler	  &	  Hochstein,	  2009).	  
Putative	  Neural	  Mechanisms	  	   The	  disproportionally	  large	  face	  inversion	  effect	  obtained	  with	  b-­‐CFS	  has	  previously	  been	  linked	  to	  stronger	  neural	  responses	  to	  upright	  than	  to	  inverted	  faces	  in	  the	  subcortical	  face	  detection	  pathway	  (Stein	  et	  al.,	  2011b;	  Zhou	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  present	  finding	  of	  expertise-­‐dependent	  inversion	  effects	  for	  cars	  now	  demonstrates	  that	  configural	  processing	  effects	  in	  access	  to	  awareness	  under	  CFS	  do	  not	  need	  to	  involve	  innate	  subcortical	  face-­‐specific	  neural	  mechanisms.	  Instead,	  our	  results	  suggest	  that	  access	  to	  awareness	  under	  CFS	  is	  more	  likely	  related	  to	  cortical	  representations	  of	  objects	  known	  to	  be	  strongly	  shaped	  by	  visual	  experience	  and	  perceptual	  expertise	  (e.g.,	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McGugin	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  For	  example,	  interindividual	  differences	  in	  face	  recognition	  abilities	  are	  associated	  with	  responses	  to	  faces	  in	  the	  fusiform	  face	  area	  (FFA;	  Furl,	  Garrido,	  Dolan,	  Driver,	  &	  Duchaine,	  2011)	  and	  interindividual	  differences	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  inversion	  on	  face	  identification	  are	  related	  to	  activity	  in	  the	  FFA	  (Yovel	  &	  Kanwisher,	  2005).	  The	  correlation	  between	  the	  effect	  of	  inversion	  on	  face	  identification	  and	  suppression	  times	  may	  thus	  reflect	  differential	  activity	  in	  cortical	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  FFA.	  Access	  to	  awareness	  for	  non-­‐face	  objects	  of	  expertise	  may	  similarly	  involve	  activity	  in	  regions	  of	  high-­‐level	  visual	  cortex	  representing	  these	  objects.	  Previous	  work	  has	  shown	  that	  these	  regions	  may	  partially	  overlap	  with	  the	  face-­‐selective	  FFA	  (Gauthier	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  McGugin	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Future	  work	  needs	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  extent	  of	  non-­‐conscious	  activity	  in	  face-­‐sensitive	  cortical	  areas	  (Sterzer,	  Haynes,	  &	  Rees,	  2008;	  Sterzer,	  Jalkanen,	  &	  Rees,	  2009)	  indeed	  predicts	  access	  to	  awareness	  for	  faces	  and	  objects	  of	  expertise	  (cf.	  Schmack,	  Burk,	  Haynes,	  &	  Sterzer,	  2015).	  	  
Conclusion	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  present	  study	  provides	  evidence	  that	  configural	  processing	  in	  conscious	  access	  is	  related	  to	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination	  skills	  and	  modulated	  by	  perceptual	  expertise.	  For	  both	  faces	  and	  cars	  overall	  discrimination	  performance	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  inversion	  on	  discrimination	  performance	  were	  related	  to	  inversion	  effects	  obtained	  with	  b-­‐CFS.	  These	  findings	  indicate	  that	  access	  to	  awareness	  and	  exemplar-­‐level	  discrimination	  rely	  on	  partially	  shared	  perceptual	  mechanisms.	  Moreover,	  the	  increased	  advantage	  of	  upright	  over	  inverted	  cars	  in	  gaining	  access	  to	  awareness	  in	  observers	  with	  greater	  car	  expertise	  suggests	  that	  extensive	  discrimination	  training	  does	  not	  only	  improve	  identification	  but	  can	  even	  determine	  whether	  an	  object	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  first	  place.	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Figure	  1.	  B-­‐CFS	  procedure	  and	  target	  stimuli.	  (a)	  Illustration	  of	  a	  trial	  in	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment.	  A	  target	  stimulus	  was	  gradually	  introduced	  to	  one	  randomly	  selected	  eye	  while	  CFS	  masks	  flashing	  at	  10	  Hz	  were	  presented	  to	  the	  other	  eye.	  Participants	  localized	  as	  quickly	  and	  accurately	  as	  possible	  the	  quadrant	  in	  which	  a	  target	  or	  any	  part	  of	  the	  target	  became	  visible.	  (b)	  Example	  stimuli.	  Participants	  localized	  (upright	  and	  inverted)	  photographs	  of	  cars,	  chairs,	  and	  faces.	  	  	   	  
AWARENESS	  FOR	  OBJECTS	  OF	  EXPERTISE	   	   36	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  (a)	  Results	  from	  the	  b-­‐CFS	  experiment.	  Bars	  show	  mean	  suppression	  times	  for	  cars,	  chairs,	  and	  faces,	  separately	  for	  stimuli	  in	  upright	  and	  inverted	  orientation.	  Error	  bars	  denote	  the	  SE	  for	  the	  mean	  difference	  between	  upright	  and	  inverted	  stimuli	  within	  each	  object	  category.	  (b)	  Results	  from	  the	  sequential	  matching	  tasks.	  Bars	  show	  mean	  discrimination	  sensitivity	  for	  cars	  and	  faces,	  separately	  for	  upright	  and	  inverted	  stimuli.	  Error	  bars	  denote	  the	  SE	  for	  the	  mean	  difference	  between	  upright	  and	  inverted	  stimuli	  within	  each	  object	  category,	  respectively.	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Figure	  3.	  (a)	  Correlation	  between	  sensitivity	  in	  the	  car	  discrimination	  task	  and	  the	  car	  inversion	  effect	  obtained	  with	  b-­‐CFS.	  Each	  dot	  represents	  a	  participant.	  (b)	  Correlation	  between	  the	  inversion	  effect	  in	  the	  car	  discrimination	  task	  and	  the	  car	  inversion	  effect	  from	  b-­‐CFS.	  In	  these	  and	  in	  the	  other	  correlation	  plots,	  the	  solid	  line	  shows	  the	  best-­‐fitting	  linear	  regression	  line	  and	  the	  dashed	  lines	  the	  associated	  95%	  confidence	  intervals.	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Figure	  4.	  (a)	  Correlation	  between	  sensitivity	  in	  the	  face	  discrimination	  task	  and	  the	  face	  inversion	  effect	  obtained	  with	  b-­‐CFS.	  (b)	  Correlation	  between	  the	  inversion	  effect	  in	  the	  face	  discrimination	  task	  and	  the	  face	  inversion	  effect	  from	  b-­‐CFS.	  	  	  	  
